American University Washington College of Law

Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of
Law
Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic
Journals

Scholarship & Research

2018

Scaling Development Finance for Our Common Future
Daniel D. Bradlow
American University Washington College of Law, bradlow@wcl.amerian.edu

Kevin P. Gallagher
Boston University

Leandro Serino
University of Pretoria

Jose Siaba Serrate
Consejo Argentino para las Relaciones Internacionales

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/facsch_lawrev
Part of the Banking and Finance Law Commons, International Law Commons, and the Law and
Economics Commons

Recommended Citation
Bradlow, Daniel D.; Gallagher, Kevin P.; Serino, Leandro; and Serrate, Jose Siaba, "Scaling Development
Finance for Our Common Future" (2018). Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic Journals. 944.
https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/facsch_lawrev/944

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Scholarship & Research at Digital Commons @
American University Washington College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Articles in Law Reviews &
Other Academic Journals by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ American University Washington
College of Law. For more information, please contact kclay@wcl.american.edu.

INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL
ARCHITECTURE FOR STABILITY
AND DEVELOPMENT

Scaling Development Finance
for Our Common Future
Kevin P. Gallagher, Global Development Policy Center, Boston
University
Leandro A. Serino, T20 Argentina
Danny Bradlow, University of Pretoria
Jose Siaba Serrate, CARI

1

www.t20argentina.org

/T20Solutions

@T20Solutions

/T20Solutions

2

An International Financial
Architecture for Stability
and Development

Abstract
The G-20 and the broader world community has committed to ambitious goals to
close global infrastructure gaps, mitigate climate change, and advance the 2030
Agenda for development. We call on G20 leaders to task development finance
institutions (DFIs) such as the development banks in member countries and the Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) of which G-20 countries are members, to commit
to scaling up resources by 25 percent, to calibrate new financing to international
commitments to mitigate climate change and the 2030 agenda, and to work together
as an inclusive system toward achieving those shared goals.

Challenge
The world community needs to annually mobilize trillions of dollars in order to close
infrastructure gaps and meet these broader goals and commitments. The private
sector and national governments are falling far short of leading the way to financing
these goals. DFIs are uniquely poised to provide and mobilze capital but the effort to
date has been under-capitalized, under-performing, and uncoordinated.
Unmet global infrastructure needs to 2030 are over $3 trillion annually if they are to
be conducted in a manner that is low carbon and socially inclusive.1 What is more,
the credit gap for micro, small and medium enterprises across the globe is upwards
of $2 trillion.2
The private sector and national governments are doing little to address these gaps
in long-run financing. Private capital flows are immense in scale but have proven
to be biased toward short-term gains -flowing in ‘surges’ and unstable ‘sudden
stops’ to emerging market and developing countries- rather than long term needs
in infrastructure and human capital formation.3 Private sector levels of investment in
gross fixed capital formation have been small and on the decline for decades. In 1980
private sector investment as a percent of gross domestic product was over 20 percent,
and has declined to roughly 18 percent (Appendix 1). New research by the International

1 McKinsey Global Institute (2016). Bridging Global Infrastructure Gaps. McKinsey & Company; World
Bank (2017). Global Infrastructure Outlook Report;
2 Peer Stein, Oya Pinar Ardic and Martin Hommes, “Closing the Credit Gap for Formal and Informal
Micro, Small, and Medium Enterprises,” World Bank, August 2016,
3 Barton, Dominic and Martin Wiseman (2013), “Investing for the Long Term,” McKinsey Global
Institute; Rey, H., 2016, “International Channels of Transmission of Monetary Policy and the Mundellian
Trilemma,” IMF Economic Review, 64(1), 6–35; Ocampo, Jose Antonio (2018), Reforming the
International Monetary System, New York, Oxford University Press.
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Monetary Fund shows that public investment in the form of fiscal policy by national
governments also tends to be be biased toward short-term electorial cycles.4
Development Finance Institutions such as national and sub-regional development
banks and multi-lateral development banks have a unique roll to play. These institutions
can take a longer-run societal view toward financing, can uphold and demonstrate
standards of excellence, and can mobilize commercial financing in tandem with their
goals. However, many DFIs have been under capitalized and underperforming, and
there is little coordination across all the DFI’s toward these common goals.
DFI’s across the world hold roughly $6 trillion in total assets, with G-20 members as
shareholders of $4.3 trillion of that total. The largest amount of DFI capital is held
in national development banks, which are $4.8 trillion of the total, and MDBs at $1.8
trilllion.5 While significant, these assets are dwarfed by the size of the need and are
not always aligned with broader development goals.
We face a great challenge to mobilize trillions more in capital to change the structure
of the world economy to one that is more sustainable and socially inclusive.6 Thus far,
in bridging the infrastructure gap, MDBs have been done a limited job at mobilizing
private capital peaking to just over $200 billion in 2010, and down to just $93 billion
in 2017.7 The Global Infractructure Facility, supported by the G-20 and the World
Bank for public-private partnerships (PPPs), has attracted a mere $84 billion and
committed just $37 million.8 Of the limited mobilization that has occurred it is not
clear that such resource mobilization has been pro-poor and has enhanced debt
sustainability, and broader development goals.9 DFIs will need to convene multistakeholder forums to align the public and private sectors in this regard.

4 International Monetary Fund (2017), Fiscal Politics, Washington, IMF.
5 Gallagher, Kevin P. and William Kring (2017), Remapping Global Economic Governance, GDP Center
Policy Brief 004, Global Development Policy Center, Boston University.
6 Bazzi, Samuel, Rikhil Bhavnani, Michael Clemens, and Steven Radelet. “Counting Chickens When They
Hatch: Timing and the Effects of Aid on Growth,”The Economic Journal, June 2012, 122: 590-617;Easterly,
William (2001), The Elusive Quest for Growth:Economists’ Adventures and Misadventures in the Tropics
Cambridge MA: MIT Press; Buntaine, Mark (2016), Giving Aid Effectively: The Politics of Environmental
Performance and Selectivity at Multilateral Development Banks, Oxford University Press,
7 World Bank (2018), 2017 Private Participation in Infrastructure Annual Report, Washington, World Bank.
8 World Bank (2018), Global Infrastructure Facility, Washington, World Bank, http://fiftrustee.
worldbank.org/Pages/gif.aspx
9 Intependent Evaluation Group (2014) World Bank Group Support to Public-Private Partnerships,
Washinton, World Bank.
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Proposals
We call on G20 leaders to task development finance institutions (DFIs) such as the
development banks in member countries and the Multi-lateral Development Banks
(MDBs) of which G-20 countries are members, to commit: to scaling up resources
by 25 percent, to calibrate new financing to international commitments to mitigate
climate change and the 2030 agenda, and to work together as an inclusive system
toward achieving those shared goals.

Scale Up Development Finance
DFIs, especially the MDBs, will need a stepwise expansion and optimization of capital
to meet our common goals. This can be accomplished by increasing the base capital
of DFIs, expanding their lending headroom, and by mobilizing capital from the
commercial sector.
DFIs will need to increase their base and callable capital and increase the lending
headroom on their balance sheets to meet broader development goals. Since the global
financial crisis some DFI’s have made significant increases to the amount of DFI capital
in the world economy but a stepwise increase from these levels is still needed.10 Chief
among those contributions has come from China. Since the crisis China has increased
the assets of the China Development Bank by $1.5 trillion, with roughly one-fifth of
its balance sheet now in overseas financing to sovereign governments outside China.
What is more, China has helped establish two new MDBs in the Asian Infrastructure
Investment Bank and the New Development Bank.11 Many national and sub-regional
development banks in emerging market and developing countries also replenished or
created new DFIs as well as they accumulated reserves due to the commodity-boom
in the aftermath of the crisis (Appendix 2). Recently, shareholders endorsed a $7.5
billion paid-in capital increase for International Bank for Reconstruction (IBRD) and
Development and $5.5 billion paid-in capital for International Finance Corporationas
well as a $52.6 billion callable capital increase for IBRD.12
In addition to further capital increases, some DFIs have significant ‘lending headroom’
10 Bhattacharya, Amar, et al, (2018), The New Global Agenda and the Future of the Multilateral
Development Bank System, Washington, Brookings Institution.
11 Gallagher, Kevin P. and William Kring (2017), Remapping Global Economic Governance, GDP Center
Policy Brief 004, Global Development Policy Center, Boston University.
12 World Bank (2018), Press Release: World Bank Group Shareholders Endorse Transformative Capital
Package, April 21, 2018. http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2018/04/21/world-bankgroup-shareholders-endorse-transformative-capital-package
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to provide more financing while continuing to maintain strong credit ratings. A
number of recent studies, including a study by Standard and Poor’s rating agency
itself, estimate that MDBs could increase their lending headroom by $598 to $1.9
trillion under various scenarios. Without a capital increase, if MDBs optimized their
balance sheets at a AAA rating, the range of increase ranges from $598 billion to $1
trillion. With a capital increase of 25 percent by major MDBs, lending could expand
by $1.2 to $1.7 trillion. If some MDBs were to optimize at a AA+ rating, expansion could
reach close to $2 trillion dollars. In the later case however, optimizing at AA+ will have
an negative impact on profitability though according to research to support this
brief the net benefits are still likely to be positive.13 In addition to expanding lending
headroom, some DFIs are considering securitizing their loan portfolios, though there
are few examples of DFI securitization and estimates of the benefits and costs of
such an approach not yet forthcoming14.
There is potential to further bridge financing gaps through blended finance and
PPPs, and DFIs can play a key role in mobilizing the much needed public and private
capital to finance sustainable infrastructure.15 Blended finance has been defined
as “the strategic use of development finance and philanthropic funds to mobilize
private capital flows to emerging and frontier markets” using such instruments as
guarantees, securitization commercial bank loans, syndicated loans, credit lines,
direct investments in companies, credit enhancement of project bonds, and shares
in special purpose vehicles.
Private participation in infrastructure projects has been promoted for many years
through PPPs and are now foscusing on the design of financial instruments to develop
infrastructure as an asset class. Unfortunately, relative to the size of the gaps private
finance of infrastructure is falling short. Blended finance has mobilized only $31 billion
through blended financing efforts since 2000.16 As noted earlier, there is promise
13 Humphrey, C. 2015. “Are Credit Rating Agencies Limiting the Operational Capacity of Multilateral
Development Banks?” 30 October 2015. Paper Commissioned for the Inter-Governmental Group
of 24. Washington DC: G24; Humphrey, C. (2018), “The Role of Credit Rating Agencies in Shaping
Multilateral Finance, Paper Commissioned for the Inter-Governmental Group of 24. Washington DC:
G24; Settimo, R. 2017. “Towards a More Efficient Use of Multilateral Development Banks’ Capital.”
Occasional Paper Series 393, September 2017. Rome: Bank of Italy; S&P Global Ratings. 2017b. “Key
Considerations for Supranationals’ Lending Capacity and Their Current Capital Endowments.” 18 May
2017. New York: S&P Global Ratings; Munir, Waqas and Kevin P. Gallagher (2018), Scaling Up Lending
at the Multilateral Development Banks, GEGI WORKING PAPER 013 Global Development Policy
Center, Boston University USA.
14 Humphrey, Christopher (2018), Channeling Private Investment to Infrastructure: What Can MDBs
Realistically Do? London: Overseas Development Institute, Working Paper 534
15 Humphrey, Christopher (2018), Channeling Private Investment to Infrastructure: What Can MDBs
Realistically Do? London: Overseas Development Institute, Working Paper 534;
16 OECD (2018), Making Blended Finance Work for the Sustainable Development Goals, Paris, OECD;
Humphrey, Christopher (2018), Channeling Private Investment to Infrastructure: What Can MDBs
Realistically Do? London: Overseas Development Institute, Working Paper 534; Lee, Nancy (2018),
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in PPPs, though should not be overblown. As noted earlier,private participation in
infrastructure projects has also been relatively small. The majority of that financing
has gone to developed and large middle-income countries. Only 24 of the poorest
countries had a single infrastructure project with private participation between 2011
and 2015.17 The Inter-Agency Task Force on Financing for Development found that of
the close to $50 billion mobilized by MDBs in private co-financing, only US$1 billion
flowing to least developed countries and little evidence that the most vulnerable in
those countries were beneficiaries.18

Finance for Development
Echoing the G-20 Eminent Persons Group, DFI “governance structures and internal
incentives should be reoriented towards achieving development impact, rather than
deployment of their own financing.”19 Maximizing finance for development is not
the same thing as optimizing development bank finance under a ‘business as usual’
scenario. Current infrastructure is responsible for the majority of carbon dioxide
emissions and lays the foundation for much of the unsustainable production and
consumption patterns and accentuates exisiting inequities in much of the global
economy today.20
Adapting to country and regional circumstances calibrating new finance to Agenda
2030 and the Paris agreements should be the guiding rationale for new financing.
What is more, DFIs will need to deploy new measurement and monitoring systems
that ensure that DFI’s maximize the development impacts and mitigate the
development and financial risks of their efforts for better development effectiveness.
Key to measuring and monitoring progress is the need to increase transparency
for measurement, evaluation, and accountability. Member states of the United
Billions to Trillions? Issues on the Role of Development Banks in Mobilizing Private finance, Washington,
Center for Global Development.
17 Humphrey, Christopher (2018), Channeling Private Investment to Infrastructure: What Can MDBs
Realistically Do? London: Overseas Development Institute, Working Paper 534; Ruiz-Nuñez, F. and
Z. Wei (2015) Infrastructure Investment Demands in Emerging Markets and Developing Economies.
World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 7414. Washington DC: World Bank.
18 Inter-Agency Task force on Financing for Development (2018), Financing for Development Progress
and Prospects 2018, New York, United Nations.
19 Eminent Persons Group, G-20 (2018), G20 Eminent Persons Group (EPG) on Global Financial
Governance: Update for the G20 Meeting of Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors, https://
g20.org/sites/default/files/media/epg_chairs_update_for_the_g20_fmcbgs_meeting_in_buenos_
aires_march_2018.pdf
20 Davis, Steven, Steven J. Davis, Ken Caldeira, Damon Matthews, “Future CO2 Emissions and Climate
Change from Existing Energy Infrastructure Science 10 Sep 2010:Vol. 329, Issue 5997, pp. 1330-1333;
Bhattacharya, Amar, Jeremy Oppenheim, Nicholas Stern (2016), Driving Sustainable Development
Through Better Infrastructure: Key Elements of a Transformation Program, Washington, Brookings
Institution, New Climate Economy.
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Nations have agreed to collect a set of global indicators to be developed by the
Inter-agency and Expert Group on Sustainable Development Goal Indicators (IAEGSDGs), indicators that can serve as a set of common agreed upon statistics that
DFI financing can be calibrated toward and measured against.21 Adopting a clear
and inclusive process to measure DFI progress for accountability will be critical to
achieving Agenda 2030.
Some DFIs are leading on climate change commitments by pledging to provide
disincentives for economic activity that accentuate climate change while simultaneously
encouraging climate friendly activity. Many of the MDBs have strong limits on the
financing of coal fired power plants, and the World Bank has pledged to end financing
for upstream oil and gas extraction by 2019.22 The Inter-American Development Bank
has pledged to all projects for relevant climate risks starting in 2018, and the Caribbean
Development Bank has explored the adoption of ‘climate-stress testing’ of their entire
balance sheet to protect it from climate-related stranded assets.23 Brazil’s national
development bank and the Development Bank of Southern Africa have created
special climate funds. The China Development Bank has been active in green bond
markets, issueing a $500 million bond certified by the Climate Bond Initiative for low
carbon wind, transport and water projects in China and Pakistan.
Strengthened and improved Environmental and Social Risk Management systems
(ESRM) beyond those that examine climate change will be essential to ensuring that
development financing is calibrated toward broader goals. While most development
banks deploy ESRM, the quality and degree to which these systems are effective
varies widely. Especially in the case of MDBs, ESRM has been perceived by host
country finance ministries and by operations staff at MDBs as onerous conditionalities
that slow project approval and completion without necessarily improving social and
environmental outcomes.24 Other work has shown that some safeguards, such as
environmental impact assessments, grievance mechanisms, and ‘free prior informed
21 Inter-Agency Task force on Financing for Development (2018), Financing for Development Progress
and Prospects 2018, New York, United Nations.
22 Piccio, Lorenzo (2016), To Coal or Not to Coal? A Balancing Act for MDBs, DevEx, https://www.
devex.com/news/coal-or-no-coal-a-balancing-act-for-mdbs-87610; World Bank (2017), World Bank
Announcements at One Planet Summit, Washington, World Bank, http://www.worldbank.org/en/
news/press-release/2017/12/12/world-bank-group-announcements-at-one-planet-summit
23 Inter-American Development Bank (2017), Delivering a Climate Agenda for Latin America,
Washington, Inter-American Developmetn Bank; Stefano Battiston, Antoine Mandel, Irene Monasterolo,
Franziska Schütze, and Gabriele Visentin, “A Climate Stress Test for the Financial System,” Nature Climate
Change volume 7, pages 283–288 (2017); Monasterolo, I., Battiston, S. (2016). Assessing portfolios’
exposure to climate risks: an application of the CLIMAFIN-tool to the Caribbean Development Bank’s
projects portfolio. Final deliverable Technical Assistance for Climate Action Support to the Caribbean
Development Bank TA2013036 R0 IF2.
24 Humphrey, Chris (2016), Time for a New Approach to Environment and Social Protection at Multilateral
Developmetn Banks, London, Overseas Development Institute; World Bank. (2010). Safeguards and
sustainability policies in a changing world. Independent Evaluation Group. Washington, DC:
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consent’ by local communities help DFIs identify and mitigate risk and improve
project outcomes.
Some DFIs, such as the Development Bank of Latin America, the KfW of Germany,
the Caribbean Development Bank, and the have a unique approach whereby
they provide grant and concessional financing as well as technical assistance to
borrowing countries to establish effective ESRMs at the project level, enhancing
the institutional capabilities of borrowing nations rather than imposing conditions
without corresponding financing.25 DFIs will need to strengthen and improve ESRMs
appropriate to country and regional circumstances and in calibration with broader
development goals by promoting a multi-stakeholder dialogue in this regard..
A new set of principles and guidelines will need to be created to ensure that PPPs
and blended finance approaches are calibrated to Agenda 2030 as well. A recent
UN assessment evaluated the guidelines of 12 major institutions including the OECD,
World Bank, IMF and others and found that the guidelines do not yet align with
Agenda 2030. Across the guidelines there is a lack of clear guidance regarding when
PPPs are appropriate and when they are not, how to align with national process &
international commitments, guidance on the Fair sharing of risk and rewards, alignment
with sustainable development / SDGs; Climate, human rights considerations, and how
to incorporate various Stakeholder perspectives.
A next generation of PPPs should be driven to align with Agenda 203o and Paris. For
this to occur, the study concludes, “governments must consistently strive to realize
broad public value and public good from PPPs. This means the public must be at
the center of PPP deliberations, decision making and delivery. Governments must
engage with citizens, weigh the socioeconomic costs and benefits of PPPs, and put
in place appropriate institutional and accountability mechanisms, systems, processes,
and capacity to achieve the fuller vision. As part of PPPs, commercial actors must
also commit and be subject to adopting appropriate standards that aligning with
broader goals26.”

Global Cooperation and Governance
The G-20 should encourage the establishment of a multi-stakeholder forum that
includes not soley national governments and MDBs, but also the broader set of
DFIs, the business community, civil society, and other key stakeholders into a
25 Yuan, Fei, and Kevin P. Gallagher (2017), “Standardizing Sustainable Development: A comparison of
development banks in the Americas,” Journal of Environment & Development 2017, Vol. 26(3) 243–271
26 Aizawa, Motoko (2018), “A Scoping of PPP Guidelines,” DESA Working Paper 154, United Nations
Department of Economic and Social Affairs.
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cooperative process. While there are a number of separate forums and platforms
for DFI collaboration, there lacks a global forum for DFI dialogue, cooperation,
coordination, and collaboration among relevant stakeholders. The World Federation
for Development Financing Institutions (WFDFI) and its regional chapters is the most
systematic set of groupings among DFIs, especially for national development banks.
The International Development Finance Club (IDFC) is the most comprehensive
attempt to bring together both national development banks, subregional development
banks, and some MDBs such as the Islamic Development Bank. Of course, as part of
the annual and spring meetings of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund
the larger Western-backed MDBs convene and at times coordinate.
From these efforts have been a number of initiatives that could be scaled and replicated
across a broader global system. The IDFC negotiated a pledge to generate $100 billion
in green financing and developed an aligned tracking and monitoring system and
then negotiated a set of ‘Common Principles for Climate Mitigation Finance Tracking’
and now regularly report on progress.27 The Inter-American Development Bank, in
part drawing on support from joint funds between China’s development banks and
central bank and the IDB, has a program with members of Latin American Association
of Development Financing Institutions (ALIDE), the Latin American regional grouping
of the WFDFI to on-lend, credit enhance, and provide technical assistance to national
development banks in the Americas for clean energy and energy efficiency, ESRM,
and have created a ‘Green Finance in Latin America’ platform.28 Deploying a similar
model, the New Development Bank of the BRICs countries raises funds on green
bond markets and on-lends for sustainable infrastructure to national development
banks in member countries.29 Germany’s KfW is working with the International
Renewable Energy Association to establish a regional liquidity facility for renewable
energy infrastructure, and the KfW and France’s AFD have had credit facilities with
the Development Bank of Latin America for some time30.
There are limitless opportunities and agendas for a global forum of coordination and
cooperation across DFIs. Shared country strategies, the development of regional
approaches (especially for infrastructure), dialogue on safeguards and standards, could
27 IDFC (2015), “Common Principles on Climate Mitigation Financing,” Germany, IDFC, International
Development Finance Corporation, https://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/65d37952-434e-40c1a9df-c7bdd8ffcd39/MDB-IDFC+Common-principles-for-climate-mitigation-finance-tracking.
pdf?MOD=AJPERES
28 Inter-American Development Bank (2018), Green Finance for Latin America, Washington, IDB,
https://www.greenfinancelac.org/projects-map/
29 New Development Bank (2017), NDB’s General Strategy, 2017-2012, Shanghai, New Development
Bank, https://www.ndb.int/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/NDB-Strategy-Final.pdf
30
International Development Finance Club (2016), Moving from Triangular Cooperation to
Cooperation for Development: New Initiatives for Deepening IDFC Collaboration, Germany, KfW, IDFC;
Griffith-Jones, Stephanie (2016), National Development Banks and Sustainable Infrastructure, the case
of the KfW, GEGI Working Paper 006, Global Development Policy Center, Boston University, USA.
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all be part of such an agenda. Over time some of the best practices discussed above
could be scaled up. Proposals for such cooperation include a global special purpose
vehicle and global guarantee funds for sustainable infrastructure, and the creation of
project platforms to facilitate crowding-in private investment, among others.31
A global forum for DFIs could also help foster a more global representation of the
stakeholders of the development process. Quoting from a recent report on the
subject that success may depend on “A vision of a system serving all developing
countries requires a governance structure that permits adequate voice.”32 given that
research shows how “when borrowing countries have more voice have: less reliance
on a compliance rules-based culture, and more cost-effective linkage between
safeguards and development benefits; less conservative financial policies; more
flexibility in allocation procedures; and less internal oversight and cost.”33 Aligning
national development banks, borrower-led sub-regional DFIs, and the MDBs as well
as with civil society participation would provide for a more cohesive and legitimate
system to coordinate, and calibrate global DFI financing toward our common future.

31 Lee, Nancy (2018), More Mobilizing, Less Lending: A Pragmatic Proposal for MDBs, Washington,
Center for Global Development; Studart, Rogerio, ad Kevin P. Gallagher (2018), Guaranteeing
Sustainable Infrastructure, Journal of International Economics, (forthcoming).
32 Bhattacharya, Amar, et al, (2018), The New Global Agenda and the Future of the Multilateral
Development Bank System, Washington, Brookings Institution.
33 Homi Kharas, “The Post-2015 Agenda and the Evolution of the World Bank Group,” The Brookings
Institution, GED Working Paper 92, September 2015

11

An International Financial
Architecture for Stability
and Development

Appendix 1

34

Private Inverstment in the World Economy
(% of GDP)

34 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (2017), Trade and Development Report,
2017), Geneva, United Nations.
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Gallagher, Kevin P. and William Kring (2017), Remapping Global Economic Governance, GDP
Center Policy Brief 004, Global Development Policy Center, Boston University.
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